The Danish Solution: Rescue of Jews in Denmark

Sofie Lene Bak, an outstanding new Danish scholar, has compiled, analyzed, and categorized the extensive research on the rescue. Her work has helped bring forth the full complexion of the complicated events associated with the Rescue.

Lawrence Baron helped put perspective on events in Denmark compared to conditions in France and the Netherlands. He suggested that the Danish response to refugee immigration in the l930's was not all that different than Holland or France. One of the unique aspects about the Danish stance toward Jews is that it protected non-Danish Jews as well. Finally, there is a paradox: countries which mounted the least resistance to Germany or were allies by choice seemed to defy Germany on the Jewish question with more impunity.

Michael Berenbaum has been an invaluable resource helping us put the Danish rescue of the Jews in the context of the Holocaust as well as assuring historical accuracy.

Andrew Buckser knows the story intimately (studied, written about, and speaks Danish) but sees it with American eyes. He has shown us how complex some of these ethical issues are, and how complex the decisions of people are when they make them. He feels the rescue can provide lessons in societal cooperation and the role institutions can play. In Denmark, he notes, the culture was inseparable from the moral action of the rescue. Danes rescued Jews not merely because of private moral choices, but because of the place of Jews in Danish culture. Ethical action, in other words, was closely intertwined with cultural categories and symbols. Buckser has pointed out the significance of the charismatic and influential 19th century Danish priest and poet, Nikolai F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). By cultivating the values and traditions which Grundtvig had called the heart of Danishness, Denmark could remain Denmark despite its political subjugation.

By viewing the rescue as an epic battle between universal values of goodness and evil, writers have made the Danes an ideal type, which no real society can live up to. By looking at the Danish rescue in its own cultural context, however, we can move to a more realistic and forgiving image of its actors. We can see them as fully human, not as figures in a morality play.

Leo Goldberger noted that in the last few years young Danish historians have done a good bit of "rewriting of history", emphasizing the ease with which the "escape" was accomplished presumably because it was in the German's best interest in terms of Danish-German relations to let us flee. In addition, they emphasize that lack of punishment meted out by the Germans vis-a-vis Danes caught helping a Jew to escape. But perhaps the most damning "revelation" of these young historians is the fact that the Danish Government refused political asylum to some 10, 000 Jewish refugees from Germany and elsewhere in the mid to late 1930's, sending them back at the border.

These revelations are beginning to seep out in publications (and on the Internet) outside of Denmark and with it has come a general downgrading of the "heroic rescue" in some quarters. The younger historians simply find the rescue story too romantic and mythic, and eschew the subjectivity of personal eyewitness testimony, preferring stark facts as generated via archival research. There may also be a generational tension operating here. The young Danes seem to be ashamed that Denmark did not put up a strong enough fight in 1940 (in contrast to the Norwegians) but instead ended up "cooperating" with the Germans --earning good money in the bargain as farmers and fishermen, shipbuilders, etc. (which is also being widely publicized these days in the Danish media.)

Elsebet Jegstrup - It was an understanding of citizenship grounded in the principles embraced by Denmark's Constitution, namely the right of all Danes to express their freedom in action, in this case on behalf of the Danish Jews. As Hannah Arendt so eloquently concludes, "Action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will . . . but springs from something altogether different which I call a principle. Principles do not operate from within the self as motives do . . . but inspire, as it were, from without; and they are much too general to prescribe particular goals, although every particular aim can be judged in the lights of its principle once the act has been started. . . . The inspiring principle becomes fully manifest only in the performing act itself."

Bruce Kirmmse explored Danish Jews' perceptions of themselves , their balance of Jewishness and Danishness This is a particularly touchy subject nowadays, not so much with the issue of Jews in Denmark but with respect to the large number of Muslim immigrants who have entered the country during the past couple of decades. Can Muslims be "Danes"? If so, why is it that the last time I check they still haven't managed to get permission to build a mosque? What is "Danishness"? When is a "Jew" also a "Dane"?

Paul Levine brought out the dynamics of Sweden's role. After the German defeat at Stalingrad in Jan/Feb 43, there existed no credible German threat against Sweden. But perhaps most importantly, the German's never really needed to threaten Sweden-- and never really did in fact, apart perhaps from the overall fear imposed by their invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940. Because the Swedes were always willing to sell to the Germans what they needed most: ballbearings, iron ore, and some other raw materials. Sweden cut its trade with Germany only late in 1944, and only in the face of severe threats by the Allies. Duckwitz' role in persuading Sweden to act has been completely exaggerated and has no basis in the documentation. He may have perhaps been involved in "getting the word out" to the Danes, and Danish Jews, but in fact he played no role whatsoever in stimulating the Swedes to act. The Swedes were well informed in advance that the Germans would probably act against Denmark's Jews, and were both completely willing to do so weeks before the action in early October and needed no convincing.

Erich Loewy explored the role of bystanders in Denmark and Europe during the Consultation phase. Beyond this lies the whole question of excusable versus culpable ignorance and the whole and universal problem of the by-stander and his or her guilt. Moreover, the distinction between culpability and responsibility needs to be kept in mind. These -- to an ethicist -- are some of the central problems

Samuel Oliner has defined and delineated altruism in the events of 1943. Oliner noted that "Much of human behavior can be explained as the result of broad social forces - political, economic, and social organizations compel the assumption of social roles that shape us. Living in any society demands submission to its organized patterns and behavioral requirements. Within such dominating structures, the individual often appears to be powerless. The existence of rescuers informs us, however, that individuals are not entirely powerless and we regard the rescue of Jews as an example of altruistic behavior." Three overriding criteria determine altruistic behavior: the rescuer had to be motivated by humanitarian considerations only, risked his or her own life, and received now remuneration of any kind for his or her act.

Lone R�nitz as an expert in immigration to Denmark in the 1930's, has enlightened us on the Danish government's attitude toward Jewish immigration. "In the early summer, 1938 the Danish borders were closed to Jewish refugees. Before that time they had been able to go up here and stay for three months. They were told that they could not settle permanently here and they could not get a work permit. They still had the opportunity to stay here and grow up here for a while. They would sort of try to find out what they are going to do in the future."

Therkel Str�de is one of our two leading historians. He has helped us in the shaping of the story and in holding on to some of the complexity of characters that has often gotten lost in earlier productions/books on the story. He has urged us to hold onto an accurate, deeper portrayal that includes the negative aftermath in Denmark. For example, Jews returning to Denmark in 1945, faced a fair amount of anti-Semitism. Str�de noted, "Division, not reunification was what came out of the refuge and return experience." In addition, he urged a stronger emphasis on Werner Best which invites more cynical conclusions than the one building on Duckwitz' altruistic motives.

Leni Yahil is our other leading historian, Leni Yahil, was the author of a seminal work, The Rescue of Danish Jewry: A Test of Democracy. Conversations with Professor Yahil and consulting her tome pushed us to much deeper levels of the story. She posed perhaps the central question, "Why, in contrast to other occupied nations, did Danes pose the threat of upheaval if their Jewish population was attacked?" Her contributions to the script and program continue to be considerable. She acknowledged, "On the whole, nobody - including me - succeeded until now to find a rational and acceptable explanation of Best's strange double dealing. Best himself never provided a convincing explanation. I counted five different versions which he used at different opportunities, therefore I did not interview him. What happened in Denmark was the product of an almost accidental combination of many factors. It was by no means the result of a special national morality. Wherever serious help was given to the Jews it was a combination of culture and politics. The Danish Democracy is rather young. The constitution was accepted only in 1848. However, it is worth mentioning that the Jews' equal rights as community and as citizens became immediately included . . . Thus was laid the ground for the mutual identification, one with the other, between Danes and Danish Jews."